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To Court Clerk: 
The State submits this letter pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In Point I. A of the Brief of Appellee, pages 7-10, the State argues that a trial court is not 
required to follow precisely the colloquy set forth in State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183,187 n.12 
(Utah 1987), when addressing a defendant who seeks to waive his right to counsel. Since the 
filing of the State's brief, a panel of this Court in State v. Vancleave, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 228, f 
17 n.7,29 P.3d 680, observed that trial courts are not required to strictly adhere to the Frampton 
colloquy. 
In Point LB of the Brief of Appellee, pages 10-11, the State argues, in part, that 
defendant's waiver of counsel was not rendered involuntary simply because the trial court failed 
to ask specifically about the voluntariness of defendant's decision. Vancleave clarifies that the 
voluntariness of a waiver of counsel does not depend on the trial court's specific questioning. Id. 
at f 16. Rather, it depends on whether the defendant was faced with the choice of proceeding 
pro se, or proceeding with incompetent counsel or counsel who a conflict of interest. Id. 
Finally, Vancleave analyzes the requirements of an "intelligent" waiver of counsel, an 
issues addressed in Point LB of the Brief of Appellee, pages 10-21. 
Sincerely, 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc Happy J Morgan Knstine M Rogers 
Grand County Public Defender 8 East Broadway #712 
8 South 100 East Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Moab, UT 84532 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 2000103 8-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the record demonstrate that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel? 
Standard of Review. "[A] trial court's determination of whether a defendant has 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel 'is a determination of 
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a fact 
determination reviewable for clear error.'" State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). Nevertheless, 
"trial courts have a reasonable measure of discretion when applying this area of law to a 
given set of facts." Id. 
2. Did the trial court correctly instruct the jury regarding the mens rea element? 
Standard of Review. "Jury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial 
will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 
352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
3. Did the trial court plainly err in failing to sua sponte dismiss the charges against 
defendant as unconstitutional under Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review. Because defendant did not preserve this issue for review, this 
Court will review only in the event of plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other 
lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 6. 
A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the 
laws of . . . this state. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) (1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, a third degree felony (R. 1). A jury convicted defendant as charged 
(R. 123). Defendant timely appealed (R. 159). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
In November, 1995 defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse, a 
third degree felony (R. 162:95-96, 165:Exhibit 3).1 
The Crime 
Three or four weeks prior to 17 August 1999 defendant showed his father-in-law, 
Dan Mick, his new automatic handgun (R. 162:77-78). Defendant took his new handgun 
out of his vehicle and handed it to his father-in-law (R. 162:78-79, 82). On at least three 
occasions in the weeks prior to 17 August 1999 defendant also discussed his new .45 
automatic handgun with Bill Huckins, the owner of B&G Trading and Pawn (R. 162:59, 
71-72). Defendant mentioned to Mr. Huckins that he wanted to get a smaller handgun for 
his wife because his handgun was too big for her (R. 162:70). In showing and discussing 
the handgun, defendant always described it as his gun (R. 162:72, 78). He never 
described it as his wife's gun (id.). 
On 17 August 1999 defendant entered B&G Trading and Pawn with a Norinco .45 
automatic handgun (R. 162:59-60, 62). Defendant told the proprietor, Mr. Huckins, that 
1
 Page 165 of the record is an envelope containing trial exhibits 1 & 3. 
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the gun was his and that he wanted to pawn it so that he could purchase another firearm 
(R. 162:60-62). He then pawned the gun for $200, signed a pawn ticket, and put his right 
thumbprint on the ticket (R. 162:60-62, 74). The pawn ticket states in bold print, "For the 
sum of $200.00 paid to me, I hereby sell and deliver to B&G TRADING & PAWN the 
following described personal property, which I warrant and represent to be my property, 
and free from all encumbrances" (R. 162:120, 165:Exhibit 1). Defendant never claimed 
that the gun was his wife's and that he was simply pawning it for her (R. 162:60). 
Waiver of Counsel 
The State charged defendant with one count of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person (R. 1). The trial court served defendant with a summons informing 
him of the charges and ordering him to appear in court and for booking (R. 3, 4-5). 
Defendant appeared for his initial appearance, but the trial court continued the hearing 
because defendant requested counsel (R. 9). The trial court appointed Ms. Happy Morgan 
to represent defendant (R. 14, 18). 
Ms. Morgan represented defendant at his initial appearance and at his preliminary 
hearing (R. 20, 27-28). Judge Lyle R. Anderson presided at defendant's preliminary 
hearing and bound him over on the charge (R. 27, 30). At defendant's request, Judge 
Anderson also arraigned him on the charge immediately following the preliminary 
hearing (id.). 
On 19 July 2000 defendant, represented by Ms. Morgan, appeared before Judge 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner to reset the trial date (R. 40, 166:4). Ms. Morgan informed the 
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trial court that defendant wished to represent himself (R. 166:4). She also informed the 
trial court that defendant had represented himself in the past on other matters and that he 
had requested that she remain as standby counsel to assist him (id.). The trial court then 
conducted a colloquy with defendant regarding his desire to represent himself (R. 166:5-
7, Add. A). During the colloquy the trial court warned defendant that he would be doing 
himself a disservice by attempting to represent himself, even with Ms. Morgan as standby 
counsel. (R. 166:6, 7, Add. A). Nevertheless, when the trial court inquired, "[n]ow with 
that in mind do you still want to go ahead and represent yourself?" defendant responded, 
"[y]es, sir. I do" (R. 166:7, Add. A). The trial court then granted defendant's request to 
represent himself and ordered Ms. Morgan to remain as standby counsel to assist him (R. 
166:7-8, Add. A). 
The Trial 
Defendant represented himself at trial (R. 162:2, 10-11, 46-157). At one point 
during trial defendant admitted that he had possessed the handgun (R. 162:82-83). On 
cross-examination of his father-in-law, defendant elicited testimony that his father-in-law 
also owned a handgun (R. 162:82-83). The following exchange then occurred: 
Q. Did I even offer to go shooting with you or did I mention shooting 
it? How it shot? Anything like that? Having any knowledge of it? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever known of me shooting it? Had any-had-
A. Shooting my pistol? 
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Q. No. Shooting mine. My having a pistol and your alleging that I'm 
showing it to you. 
A. No. I don't know if you ever - whether you shot your pistol. 
(R. 162:83). Defendant also admitted at trial that he had shown the handgun to Mr. Mick, 
prior to pawning it (R. 114-15). 
Defendant testified that the gun belonged to his wife, and that they pawned it to get 
money to fix her car (R. 162:112). He also testified that it was his wife that brought the 
gun into the pawn shop and set it on the counter (id.) He stated that he signed the pawn 
ticked and put his thumbprint on it because his wife did not have her I.D. (R. 162:113). 
After deliberating less than twenty-three minutes the jury found defendant guilty as 
charged (R. 101, 123). 
At a post-verdict review hearing defendant requested counsel (R. 139). The trial 
court reappointed Ms. Morgan (id.). The trial court later sentenced defendant to the 
statutory term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 148-49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that he unknowingly, 
unintelligently, or involuntarily waived his right to counsel. Defendant's observation that 
the trial court did not explicitly discuss each point of the Frampton colloquy does not 
satisfy his burden, because the trial court was not required to comply with the Frampton 
precisely. In any event, the record demonstrates defendant's knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of counsel. 
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The jury instructions as a whole informed the jury of the State's burden to prove, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea. Although 
the "elements instruction" did not list the mens rea element, instruction six informed the 
jury of the State's duty to prove defendant's intentional or knowing action, and 
instruction seven informed the jury of the State's duty to prove defendant's mens rea 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the jury instructions erroneously instructed the jury 
regarding the mens rea element, defendant has not demonstrated a manifest injustice, nor 
can he because the overwhelming evidence established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
he acted intentionally or knowingly. 
Finally, defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court plainly erred in not sua 
sponte dismissing the case on the grounds that Section 76-10-503 violated his right to 
bear arms under Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT 
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that the record fails to show that he knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Br. of Applt. at 7-15. Defendant, however, "has 
the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive this 
right." State v. Frampton, 1YI P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). He fails to meet his burden. 
In any event, the record demonstrates that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 
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A. Defendant fails to meet his burden. 
When a defendant declines an offer of counsel by the trial judge, he has the burden 
on appeal of showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel. Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187; State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 22, 979 
P.2d 799; State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this case 
defendant was represented by appointed counsel, Ms. Happy Morgan (R. 14, 18). Ms. 
Morgan represented defendant from his initial appearance (R. 20), through his 
preliminary hearing (R. 27-28), and up to 19 July 2000, when defendant requested that he 
be allowed to represent himself (R. 166:4, Add. A). Therefore, because defendant 
declined an offer of counsel, he now bears the burden of showing that his waiver of his 
right to counsel was invalid. See Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187. Defendant fails to meet his 
burden. 
Rather than demonstrating that his waiver of counsel was unknowing, 
unintelligent, or involuntary, defendant simply asserts that the trial court failed to discuss 
each point of the Frampton colloquy with him. Br. of Applt. at 2, 13-14. The State 
acknowledges that the trial court did not discuss each point of the Frampton colloquy (R. 
166:5-7). Nevertheless, the trial court was not required to follow the Frampton colloquy 
precisely. State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 783 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)("[T]hese 
guidelines are only suggestions rather than mandatory requirements."); State v. Tenney, 
913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ('This colloquy is not mandatory."). Speaking 
of the suggested Frampton colloquy this Court declared, "[t]he supreme court did not, nor 
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do we, mandate that all of these points be covered in the court's colloquy with the 
defendant, but suggest that they provide a useful framework." Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732 
n.14. 
The Utah Supreme Court did not mandate strict adherence to the Frampton 
colloquy in State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). In Heaton, the trial court failed to 
conduct any type of colloquy with the defendant before allowing him to waive his right to 
counsel. Id. at 914, 918. Given the complete absence of any colloquy, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to review the record and make a de novo determination regarding the 
validity of the waiver. Id. at 918. Rather, the court recognized that the responsibility to 
ensure a valid waiver is best left to the trial court, since it has the benefit of questioning 
the defendant and observing his demeanor. Id. 
However, Heaton did not impose new requirements for a trial court to follow in 
ensuring a valid waiver. Heaton simply reiterated that a trial court "must conduct a 
thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver 
of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Id. (citing Frampton, 12>1 
P.2d at 187-88)). It did not mandate that the trial court use the Frampton colloquy, 
although it "strongly recommend[ed] that the trial courts use that approach." Id. at 918 
n.5. 
Defendant would have this Court treat a waiver of counsel colloquy like a guilty 
plea colloquy conducted under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In fact, 
defendant describes the Frampton colloquy as "[t]he suggested/?/ea colloquy set forth in 
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footnote 12 of Frampton'' Id. at 11 (emphasis added). A guilty plea colloquy requires 
strict compliance. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987). The Frampton 
colloquy, however, is simply a suggestion, albeit a "strongly recommended one." See 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 n.5. Thus, because the Frampton colloquy is not mandatory, see 
id., defendant cannot satisfy his burden to show an invalid waiver simply by noting that 
the trial court did not precisely follow the suggested Frampton colloquy. Because 
defendant does nothing more, Br. of Applt. at 13-14, he fails to satisfy his burden to show 
that he unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily waived his right to counsel. See 
Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187. 
B. Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel. 
In any event, defendant cannot meet his burden because the record demonstrates 
that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. When 
describing a waiver of counsel, the terms "knowing," "voluntary," and "intelligent" have 
particular meaning. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779 (quoting Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732 n.l 1). 
"'Knowing' refers to a defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel... while 
'voluntary5 means "free from official coercion." Id. "Intelligent' . . . means 'only that the 
defendant has been provided with adequate information on which to make his or her self-
representation choice.'" Id. 
Defendant does not assert that his waiver was unknowing because he makes no 
claim that he was incompetent at the time of his waiver. Br. of Applt. at 13-15. 
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Moreover, his cogent responses during the trial court's colloquy (R. 166:4-7, Add. A) 
demonstrate his competence. 
Nor does defendant dispute the voluntariness of his waiver. Br. of Applt. at 13-15. 
Although defendant states that the trial court did not ask him whether his waiver was 
voluntary or make a specific finding of voluntariness, Br. of Applt. at 13, he does not 
explain how his waiver was involuntary. In any event, the voluntariness of defendant's 
waiver is apparent from the record. It was defendant who proposed that he be allowed to 
represent himself (R. 166:4-5, Add. A). Up to that point he had been represented by 
counsel and he expressed no dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, even requesting that 
she remain as standby counsel (R. 166: 4-6, Add. A). Following the trial court's colloquy 
and repeated warnings about the disadvantages of self-representation, the trial court 
finally asked "[n]ow with that in mind do you still want to go ahead and represent 
yourself?" (R. 166:7, Add. A). Defendant replied, "[y]es, sir. I do" (id.). Thus, the 
record demonstrates that defendant's waiver was "free from official coercion" and 
therefore voluntary. See McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. 
Defendant only challenges the intelligent nature of his waiver. As noted above, 
defendant's argument consists entirely of pointing out portions of the suggested 
Frampton colloquy that the trial court did not discuss with him. Br. of Applt. at 13-15. 
The record establishes, however, that although the trial court may not have discussed each 
point of the Frampton colloquy, defendant knew what he was doing and waived his right 
to counsel with his "eyes open." See Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. 
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This Court may look to the record to determine whether defendant "intelligently" 
waived his right to counsel. See Frampton, 111 P.2d at 188 ("Even absent such a 
colloquy, however, this Court will look at any evidence in the record which shows a 
defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se.")\State v. Valencia, 2001 
Ut. Ct. App. 159 f 22, 421 Utah Adv. Rep 11 (examining record even absent any 
colloquy); McDonald, 922 P.2d at 784 (examining the totality of the circumstances as 
reflected in the record to decide whether defendant's waiver was valid). 
Heaton does not prevent this Court from examining the record. As noted above, 
the Heaton court refused to examine the record and make a de novo determination 
regarding the validity of the waiver where the trial court failed to conduct any type of 
colloquy or "meaningful inquiry of the defendant." 958 P.2d at 914, 918. Thus, when a 
trial court completely abdicates its "important responsibility" to determine the validity of 
a defendant's waiver of counsel, Heaton prevents a reviewing court from usurping that 
responsibility, absent extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 918. However, when a trial 
court conducts a colloquy, Heaton does not prevent a reviewing court from looking to the 
record to determine whether the trial court fulfilled its responsibility to ensure a valid 
waiver. See id. In this case the trial court conducted a colloquy with the defendant (R. 
166:4-8). Thus, this Court may look to the record to determine whether the trial court 
correctly found that defendant intelligently waived his right to counsel. Frampton, 12>1 
P.2d at 188; Valencia, 2001 Ut. Ct. App. 159, \ 22, 421 Utah Adv. Rep 11; McDonald, 
922 P.2d at 784. 
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When a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court "must advise 
the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 'so that the record 
will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (quoting Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). 
Additionally, the trial court should: 
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent himself; 
(2) ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to 
understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent 
himself, including the expectation that the defendant will comply with 
technical rules and the recognition that presenting a defense is not just a 
matter of telling one's story; and 
(3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the charges and 
proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Id. The record demonstrates that defendant understood all of these consequences of 
choosing to represent himself and therefore "intelligently" waived his right to counsel. 
First, the record demonstrates that defendant understood his constitutional rights 
regarding representation. Defendant certainly understood that he had a right to counsel 
because he had earlier requested and was appointed counsel (R. 9, 14, 18). In fact, he 
was represented by counsel at the time he requested to represent himself (R. 166:4-5, 
Add. A). The trial court also advised defendant of his right to self-representation, stating 
that he was "entitled to represent [himjself, if [he] wish[ed]" (R. 166:7, Add. A). 
Second, the record demonstrates that the defendant had the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of his decision to proceed pro se. 
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Defendant had attended three-and-a-half years of college (R. 166:7, Add. A), and 
intelligently responded to the trial court's questions during the colloquy (R. 166:5-7, Add. 
A). More importantly, the trial court was aware that defendant had previously 
represented himself on other matters (R. 166:4, Add. A). Defendant complains that the 
trial court did not inquire about his "experience representing himself in, or even 
experiencing or witnessing a criminal trial." Br. of Applt. at 14. No inquiry was 
necessary, however, because defendant and Ms. Morgan volunteered this information (R. 
166: 4-6, Add. A). Ms. Morgan informed the trial court that defendant "feels that he can 
represent himself. He's done so in the past on other matters" (R. 166:4, Add. A). Also, 
during the colloquy defendant explained that he had been on parole (R. 166:6, Add. A), 
indicating that he had experienced at least one prior criminal proceeding. 
In accordance with the suggested Frampton colloquy, the trial court also asked 
defendant whether he had ever been to law school or received any legal training (R. 
166:5, Add. A). Although defendant responded that he did not have any formal legal 
training, he explained that he had read law books and "the rules . . . of trial; [and] lots of 
evidence area rules of what can be brought forth, what can't be brought forth" (R. 166:6, 
Add. A). Defendant also explained that he had studied the issues that would arise in his 
trial, specifically, his rights as a parolee {id.). 
Although the trial court inquired whether defendant was familiar with the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, {id.\ defendant complains that the trial court 
did not inform him that he would be required to follow those rules. Br. of Applt. at 13-
14 
14. Again, no inquiry was necessary because defendant demonstrated his understanding 
that he would be required to follow those rules (R. 166:6). Defendant explained that he 
had studied "the rules . . . of trial; [and] lots of the evidence area rules of what can be 
brought forth, what can't be brought forth" (R. 166:6, Add. A) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, defendant also requested that Ms. Morgan remain as standby counsel 
specifically because of his lack of proficiency with the rules of evidence and procedure 
(id.). Thus, defendant understood that he would be required to follow those rules and 
requested that Ms. Morgan help him do so (id.). Furthermore, he also understood the 
need to follow the rules of evidence and criminal procedure because of his prior 
experience representing himself (R. 166:4, Add. A). 
Defendant also complains that the trial court did not inform him that it would not 
assist him in defending himself and did not explain the procedural impact of self-
representation on his own testimony. Br. of Applt. at 14. Again, no inquiry was 
necessary because defendant demonstrated that he understood these consequences of self-
representation. Defendant's previous experience representing himself and his recognition 
that he would need the assistance of standby counsel, demonstrated his understanding that 
the trial court would not give him advice or otherwise help in conduct his defense (R. 
166:4, 6, Add. A). Given his previous experience with self-representation, defendant also 
understood that testimony would have to be presented in question and answer format, and 
that presenting a defense was not just a matter of telling one's story (R. 166:4, Add. A). 
See Heaton, 958 P.2d 918. Indeed, defendant demonstrated this understanding when he 
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explained his reasons for choosing to represent himself. He explained that he wanted to 
represent himself because of "[t]he direction I'd like my questioning in my trial to go . . . 
and the questioning that I personally would like asked, the line of questioning in order to 
draw out the evidence that I would like drawn out" (R. 166:5, Add. A). Ms. Morgan also 
explained to the Court that defendant understood the impact of self-representation on the 
presentation of testimony at trial when she warned the court that it may want to schedule 
extra time for the trial, "given the fact that [defendant] will be questioning witnesses" (R. 
166:4, Add. A). 
Furthermore, defendant's performance at trial demonstrated his understanding of 
the complexities of handling witnesses and presenting a defense. See McDonald, 922 P.2d 
at 784-85 (relying on defendant's previous experience in a criminal trial and his 
performance at trial as evidence that he understood the complexities of presenting a 
defense and that the trial court could not help him in doing so); State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 
750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (relying on defendant's performance at trial as evidence 
that he understood he would be required to present testimony in a question and answer 
format). For example, defendant cross-examined the State's witnesses (R. 162:57-59, 63-
71, 72-73, 80-89, 91-94) and interposed successful objections during the State's direct 
examination of its witnesses (R. 162:76, 78, 90). The trial court also allowed defendant 
to give his own testimony in narrative format (R. 162:111-29). 
In sum, the record demonstrates that defendant had the intelligence to understand 
and appreciate his decision to represent himself. He had attended over three years of 
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college, had previously represented himself, and had studied the legal issues in his case 
(R. 166:5-7, Add. A). He understood the need to comply with evidentiary and procedural 
rules, and that presenting a defense was not just a matter of telling one's story (id.). Most 
importantly, he understood the value of having standby counsel to advise and assist him 
(id.). Thus, the trial court correctly ascertained that defendant "possesse[d] the 
intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to 
represent himself." See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
Third, although defendant claims that the trial court failed to discuss the charge or 
potential penalty defendant faced, Br. of Applt. at 13, the record demonstrates that 
defendant understood both the charge and the potential penalty he faced. The trial court 
had previously served him with a summons ordering him to appear in court and for 
booking on the charge of felon in possession of a handgun, a third degree felony (R. 3, 4-
5). At the time he decided to represent himself, defendant also had been through a 
preliminary hearing on the charges where he was represented by counsel (R. 27). He was 
also arraigned on the charges immediately following the preliminary hearing (id.). 
Defendant evidenced his understanding of the nature of the charges when he stated during 
the colloquy that he had studied his rights "as someone who was on parole by the State of 
Utah. And those are issues that are going to be in my trial" (R. 166:6, Add. A). Indeed, 
defendant understood the nature of the charges and the proceedings because during jury 
voir dire he requested the trial court to ask the jury panel whether any of them owned a 
handgun or if they belonged to the NRA or an anti-handgun group (R. 162:36). 
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Defendant also understood the range of punishment for a third degree felony 
because he was on parole from a third degree felony sentence at the time he committed 
this crime (R. 1, 27, 95, 165:Exhibit 3). Moreover, after the jury's verdict was 
announced, defendant explained to the trial court that he understood he would be going to 
prison for zero-to-five years. (R. 162:162-63). Thus, the record demonstrates that 
defendant understood the nature of the charge against him and the possible punishment he 
faced. See Heaton,95S?.2dat9\$. 
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court did not point out the dangers of self-
representation in any specific way. Br. of Applt. at 14. On the contrary, as discussed 
above, the trial court explicitly discussed several of the points of the Frampton colloquy 
with defendant (R. 166:5-7, Add. A). Moreover, defendant volunteered his understanding 
of any omitted points (R. 166:4-7, Add. A) and confirmed his understanding through his 
performance at trial (R. 162:36, 57-59, 63-73, 76, 78, 80-89, 91-94, 162-63). 
Furthermore, as this Court observed in McDonald, "[o]f all the guidelines 
recommended in Frampton, the court's recommendation against self-representation 
probably best ensures that defendant will understand the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation." 922 P.2d at 785. In this case the trial court recommended, three 
times, that defendant not represent himself. First, it warned defendant that he would be 
doing himself a disservice in representing himself because, although he had been to 
college, he had not concentrated on the study of law (R. 166:6-7, Add. A). Second, the 
trial court cautioned defendant that he would face a prosecutor who was trained in the law 
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and who had a duty to attempt to prove him guilty (R. 166:7, Add. A). Finally, the trial 
court repeated that it believed defendant would be doing himself a disservice by trying to 
represent himself, even with Ms. Morgan as standby counsel (id.). These three warnings 
"ensure[d] that defendant. . . underst[oo]d the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation." McDonald, 922 P.2d at 785. 
In determining whether defendant has intelligently waived his right to counsel, 
"[t]he ultimate test is not the trial court's express advice, but rather the defendant's 
understanding." McDonald, 922 P.2d at 779. The trial court's colloquy, the information 
volunteered by defendant, the information in the record at the time defendant waived his 
right to counsel, and defendant's performance at trial demonstrate that he understood "the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation," and that he made his choice "with eyes 
open." See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. 
Even if there were deficiencies in the trial court's colloquy, this Court has 
recognized that the presence of standby counsel is a significant safeguard that may offset 
deficiencies in the colloquy. McDonald, 922 P.2d at 785. Significantly, it was defendant 
who, without the trial court's prompting, recognized the need for standby counsel and 
requested Ms. Morgan's assistance (R. 162:2, 10-11, 166:4, 6-7). The trial court granted 
that request (R. 162:7-8). Thus, even if there were deficiencies in the colloquy, 
defendant's request for, and Ms. Morgan's presence as, standby counsel offset those 
deficiencies. See McDonald, 922 P.2d at 785. 
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Defendant claims that this Court cannot view Ms. Morgan's presence as mitigating 
any deficiencies in the colloquy because the trial court limited her service to defendant. 
Br. of Applt. at 15. Defendant mischaracterizes the nature of the court's comments on 
Ms. Morgan's duties. Review of the trial court's statements in context reveals that rather 
than placing a limitation on Ms. Morgan's activities, the trial court was simply explaining 
to the prospective jurors why defendant would have an attorney present who would not be 
actively participating in the trial (R. 162:10-11, Add. B). As it introduced the case to the 
prospective jurors prior to the formal juror voir dire, the trial court explained that the case 
would be "a little bit unusual," because defendant had chosen to represent himself (R. 
162:10, Add. B). The trial court also explained that defendant's choice to represent 
himself was "something that [they] should not concern [themselves] with" (id.). The trial 
court admonished the prospective jurors to give defendant "every . . . presumption that he 
. . . would get if he were represented by an attorney," that they were "not to change the 
burden of proof," or "to appoint [them]selves as his lawyer because he doesn't have one" 
(id.). 
Still addressing the prospective jurors, the trial court then explained Ms. Morgan's 
role as standby counsel: "She can answer his questions and help him understand the 
procedures that are being followed in the courtroom, but it is not her responsibility to 
represent him" (R. 162:11, Add. B). The trial court continued, "[s]he's not to ask 
questions. She's not to speak for him. She's there as a resource to him. I just wanted 
you to understand that so that will explain the reason why she's seated at the table" (id.). 
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In this context, the trial court's comments regarding Ms. Morgan's role were not 
intended to, nor did they, limit her ability to assist defendant. The comments were not 
even directed to Ms. Morgan or defendant (R. 162:10-11, Add. B). Rather, they were 
simply an explanation to curious potential jurors about why defendant would have a 
lawyer present who would not actively participate in the case. Instead of restricting Ms. 
Morgan's role, the trial court's comments freed the defendant from any prejudice the 
potential jurors might feel towards him because of his decision to represent himself. 
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Ms. Morgan assisted defendant several 
times throughout trial. Defendant consulted with Ms. Morgan regarding the exercise of 
his peremptory strikes (R. 162:41) and his cross-examination of a witness (R. 162:85). 
Ms. Morgan also interjected before defendant testified, to ensure that the record reflected 
his understanding of his Fifth Amendment rights (R. 162:110-11). Finally, defendant 
consulted with Ms. Morgan in deciding not to call his wife to testify (R. 162:128-29). 
Thus, the trial court did not restrict Ms. Morgan's role as standby counsel, either in theory 
or in practice. Accordingly, her presence as standby counsel was a "significant 
safeguard" that offset any deficiencies in the trial court's colloquy. See McDonald, 922 
P.2d at 785. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY REGARDING THE MENS REA ELEMENT 
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to correctly instruct the jury 
regarding the mens rea element of his crime. Br. of Applt. at 15-19. He acknowledges 
that he failed to preserve this issue thorough a proper objection in the trial court and urges 
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tnis L,ourt to review me issue under the plain error exception. Br. of Applt. at 18. The 
standard of review for challenges to unpreserved jury instructions is usually characterized 
as review for manifest injustice. State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). Nevertheless, whether designated as review for plain error 
or manifest injustice, the analysis is the same. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 
(Utah 1998) (holding that claims of manifest injustice are reviewed under same standard 
that is applied to determine whether plain error exists); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 1 
(Utah 1989)("[I]n most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with 
the 'plain error' standard."). "The standard is two-pronged. 'First, the error must be 
obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial 
rights of a party.5" Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1226 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1109 (Utah 1996)). 
Defendant asserts that the absence of an accurate elements instruction is sufficient 
in itself to constitute plain error and merit reversal. Br. of Applt. at 16, 19. Defendant is 
incorrect. It is the complete failure to give any type of elements instruction that has been 
held to constitute plain error and satisfy the manifest injustice standard. Gibson, 908 P.2d 
at 354 (citing State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). However, defendant 
does not claim that the trial court failed to give an elements instruction. Br. of Applt. at 
15-19. Rather, he complains that although instruction six informed the jury of the mens 
rea element, neither instruction six nor any other instruction required the jury to 
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adjudicate that element of the offense.2 Id. at 18. Thus, because he challenges the 
accuracy of the elements instructions - rather than the total absence of an elements 
instruction - defendant must demonstrate manifest injustice. See Rudloph, 970 P.2d at 
1225-26 (reviewing for manifest injustice an instruction that inaccurately stated an 
element of the offense); State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(applying manifest injustice standard where instructions omitted one element of the 
offense). 
A. The jury instructions were not erroneous. 
First, defendant cannot demonstrate that the jury instructions were erroneous. It 
makes no difference that the mens rea element was contained in a separate instruction (R. 
109, 112, Add. C). See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). All of the elements 
of the charged crime need not be contained in a single jury instruction, although the better 
practice is to do so. Id. "So long as the jury is informed what each element is and that 
each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructions taken as a whole may be 
adequate even though the essential elements are found in more than one instruction." Id. 
In this case the court gave an "elements instruction," instruction three, that listed 
the statutory elements of the crime and informed the jury that the State had to prove each 
of the listed elements beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 109, Add. C). Instruction three did 
2
 The State does not dispute that it had the burden of proving that defendant 
intentionally or knowingly possessed or transferred the handgun. See State v. Davis, 711 
P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985) (affirming a conviction under Section 76-10-503 because the 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant intentionally and 
knowingly exercised control over the handgun). 
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not list a mens rea element, however (id.). Thus, the issue becomes whether the jury 
instructions as a whole informed the jury that the State was required to prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea. See Salt Lake City v. 
Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating that this Court reviews the jury 
instructions as a whole). The instructions did so. 
Instruction six informed the jury of the mens rea element. It stated that "[t]he state 
must show that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly" (R. 112, Add. C) (emphasis 
added). Additionally, instruction seven stated that "[a] defendant is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . If a defendant's guilt is not shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. The state must prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 113, Add. C). Thus, instruction six's mandatory language 
that the State "must show that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly" (R. 112, Add. 
C) (emphasis added) coupled with instruction seven's mandatory language that "[t]he 
state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 113, Add. C) (emphasis added) 
informed the jury of the State's responsibility to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
defendant acted with the requisite mens rea in addition to the other elements listed in 
instruction three. See State v. Nash, 932 P.2d 442, 443-445 (Kan. 1997) (reading the 
reasonable doubt and aiding and abetting instructions together to remedy the failure of 
aiding and abetting instruction to state that the jury must find that element beyond a 
reasonable doubt); People v. Couch, 500 P.2d 967, 970 (Colo. 1972) (en banc.) (finding 
that the specific intent and reasonable doubt instructions, when read together, adequately 
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informed the jury of the law). Thus, the instructions were not erroneous because, as a 
whole, they informed the jury that the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all 
of the elements of the crime including defendant's intentional or knowing possession or 
transfer of the handgun. See Laine, 618 P.2d at 35. 
B. Any error was not obvious. 
Even if the separate mens rea instruction was erroneous, that error was not obvious 
to the trial court. Indeed, the trial court might reasonably have relied on Laine fs holding 
that all the essential elements do not necessarily have to be included in a single 
instruction. Id. 
Moreover, any error was not obvious to defendant, nor to his standby counsel. 
Standby counsel was present while defendant, the prosecutor, and the trial court reviewed 
the jury instructions, yet made no objections and did not encourage or advise defendant to 
do so (R. 162:134-42). Furthermore, defendant was familiar with the jury instructions 
and had a chance to object (R. 162:134-39). In fact, defendant objected to jury instruction 
five and convinced the trial court to replace the second sentence in that instruction to 
read, "[a] person possesses whatever he controls," rather than "[a] person possesses 
whatever he has the ability and intent to control" (R. I l l , 162:134-36). Thus, although 
defendant was familiar with the instructions and both he and his counsel had an 
opportunity to object, neither noticed the error that he would now have this Court believe 
should have been obvious below. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (observing that if error should have been plain to the court it should also have been 
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plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an objection), vacated on other grounds, 
925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). 
C. Any error did not affect the verdict. 
Assuming, without conceding, that there was some error in the mens rea jury 
instruction and that the error was obvious, defendant must still demonstrate that the error 
was of sufficient magnitude that it affected his substantial rights. See Rudolph, 970 P.2d 
at 1226. In other words, defendant "must show a reasonable likelihood that absent the 
error, the outcome below would have been more favorable." Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. 
Defendant cannot make such a showing, because his intentional or knowing possession or 
transfer of the handgun was established, beyond a reasonable doubt, by overwhelming 
evidence - some of it from his own mouth. 
For example, Bill Huckins, the pawn broker, testified that it was defendant who 
brought the handgun into the pawn shop and set it own the counter (R. 162:60). There 
was no chance that it was defendant's wife who brought in the handgun (id.). Defendant 
even told Mr. Huckins that it was his gun (R. 162:61) and explained that he was pawning 
the gun so that he could purchase another firearm (R. 162:62). Defendant then signed and 
put his thumbprint on a pawn ticket that stated in bold print, "[f]or the sum of $200 paid 
me I hereby sell and deliver B&G Trading and Pawn the following described personal 
property which I warrant and represent to be my property free from all encumbrances" 
(R. 162:118-120, 165:Exhibit 1) (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Huckins also testified that in the month before defendant pawned the gun, 
defendant mentioned on at least three occasions that he had a .45 automatic, the same 
caliber as the gun he pawned (R. 162:71-72). Defendant also told Mr. Huckins that he 
wanted to get a different gun for his wife because his gun was too large (R. 162:70) 
(emphasis added). Additionally, although defendant claimed that the gun was his wife's, 
and that he merely signed the pawn slip and put his thumbprint on it because she did not 
have her identification (R. 162:112-14), defendant asked Mr. Huckins on cross-
examination: "do you remember how long the transaction took you and I to complete?" 
(R. 162:67) (emphasis added). Defendant's own characterization of the transaction as 
occurring between himself and Mr. Huckins, was perhaps the most convincing evidence 
that he both possessed the handgun and was responsible for pawning it, despite his 
testimony to the contrary. 
Furthermore, Dan Mick, defendant's father-in-law, also testified that defendant 
had asked him if he wanted to see defendant's handgun about a month before he pawned 
it (R. 162:77-78) (emphasis added). Defendant did not describe the gun as his wife's 
(id.). In fact, Mr. Mick testified that defendant got his handgun out of his vehicle and 
showed it to Mr. Mick (R. 162:78). On cross-examination, defendant elicited testimony 
from Mr. Mick that defendant handled the gun when he showed it to Mr. Mick (R. 
162:82). Defendant also asked Mr. Mick, if he had a handgun and if defendant had ever 
offered to go shooting with Mr. Mick (R. 162:83). Defendant then asked Mr. Mick, 
"[h]ad you ever known of me shooting \\T\id.). When a confused Mr. Mick inquired 
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"[sjhooting my pistol?" (id.), defendant clarified, "[n]o. Shooting mine. My having a 
pistol and your alleging that I'm showing it to you" (id.) (emphasis added). Mr. Mick 
responded "No. I don't know if you ever - whether you shot your pisto r (id.) (emphasis 
added). Again, defendant's own words contradicted his later testimony that the gun was 
his wife's. 
Finally, during his own testimony defendant admitted to possessing the gun. He 
admitted that he took the gun out of his wife's truck and showed it to Mr. Mick (R. 
162:114-15). He also admitted that although he claimed his wife owned the gun, he 
believed that the gun was the couple's community property and therefore he could pawn it 
for her (R. 162:121-23). 
A person acts "intentionally" "when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(1) (1999). A 
person acts "knowingly" "when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances." Id. at §76-2-103(2) (1999). Defendant's admissions that he had shown 
the handgun to Mr. Mick (R. 162:114-15), that the handgun belonged to him as his 
community property (R. 162:121-23), and that he carried out the transaction to pawn the 
handgun (R. 162:67) established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant consciously 
possessed and transferred the handgun, or that he was at least aware that he did so. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1999). This was not a complicated case; the 
jury deliberated less than twenty-three minutes (R. 101). Thus, even assuming some 
obvious error in the mens rea instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the 
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error, the outcome below would have been more favorable to defendant. See Verde, 770 
P.2datl22. 
D. No exceptional circumstances exist. 
Defendant also contends that exceptional circumstances justify this Court's review 
of the unpreserved jury instruction issue. Br. of Applt. at 19. The law is clear, however, 
that unpreserved challenges to jury instructions are only reviewed for manifest injustice. 
See Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1225-26 (stating the court's reluctance to review unpreserved 
challenges to jury instructions). Furthermore, "[w]ith the possible exception of an 
aberration or two, 'exceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, properly 
reserved for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare procedural 
anomalies.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). This is not such a case. 
The exceptional circumstances which defendant cites do not exist in this case. 
Defendant claims that this case is exceptional because the trial court erroneously allowed 
him to represent himself and placed unlawful limitations on his standby counsel. Br. of 
Applt. at 19-20. This is not a "rare procedural anomal[y]." See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 
n.3. Moreover, as discussed above, the trial court did not err in permitting defendant to 
waive his right to counsel, or in appointing standby counsel to assist him. See Point 1, 
above. Thus, the exceptional circumstances doctrine does not justify separate review of 
defendant's unpreserved challenge to the jury instructions. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERROR IN 
FAILING TO DISMISS THE CHARGES AGAINST 
DEFENDANT ON THE GROUNDS THAT SECTION 76-10-
503 VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Defendant complains that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 violates his right to bear 
arms as guaranteed by Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Br. of Applt. at 20-
21. Defendant's claim fails because he did not to raise this issue below and does not 
demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
A. Defendant failed to preserve the issue. 
Defendant never argued below that Section 76-10-503 violated the Utah 
Constitution (R. 162:131-32, 141-42). Rather, his only argument was that Section 76-10-
503 violated the Federal Constitution (id.). He stated, "[i]t is my federal constitutional 
right to own and possess a firearm" (R. 162:131-32) (emphasis added). "I know that Fm 
allowed to by a document signed by Thomas Jefferson, yes, sir" (R. 162:132). Defendant 
later renewed his objection stating, "I have a constitutional right to bear an arm [sic] . . . 
and I'd like the Court to dismiss the case because the Constitution says so. Federally I 
can" (R. 162:141) (emphasis added). Defendant never mentioned the Utah Constitution, 
or argued, as he does now, that the Utah Constitution grants him a greater right to bear 
arms than the Federal Constitution (R. 162:131-32, 141-42). Because defendant did not 
assert his Utah Constitutional argument, his claim is unpreserved. See State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Utah 1998) ("To properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party must 
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make an objection "stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection."). 
Defendant argues that he brought the issue to the trial court's attention to the best 
of his abilities. Br. of Applt. at 24 n. 13. However, defendant's pro se status does not 
excuse his failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review. See State v. Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45, f ^ 9> 56> 9 7 9 p - 2 d 7 9 9 (reviewing only for plain error defendant's 
unpreserved challenge to the prosecution's closing argument even though he represented 
himself at trial). 
Because defendant failed to preserve his current challenge to the constitutionality 
of Section 76-10-503, this Court should only reach the issue if the trial court committed 
plain error, or there are exceptional circumstances. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Neither exception applies to this case. 
B. No exceptional circumstances exist. 
Likewise, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's constitutional 
challenge under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. Again, defendant relies on his 
allegedly invalid waiver of counsel as constituting exceptional circumstances. Br. of 
Applt. at 25-26. Because the waiver was valid, however, it cannot constitute an 
exceptional circumstance. See Point 1, above. 
C. The trial court did not obviously err. 
This Court has already ruled that a claim that section 76-10-503 is unconstitutional 
in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution does not establish plain error. Id. 
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at 926. In Archambeau, this Court declared, "[a]n amendment to the state constitution 
does not obviously invalidate prior Utah authority approving Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2), particularly where there is no supportive legislative history." Id. (footnotes 
omitted). The unsupportive legislative history to which this Court cited is the same 
legislative history defendant attaches as addenda to his brief. Br. of Applt. at Add. VI & 
VII. Thus, as in Archambeau, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's 
constitutional challenge. See 820 P.2d at 926. 
Defendant claims that Archambeau is distinguishable because Archambeau was 
represented by counsel who did not raise the issue, whereas defendant acted pro se and 
raised the issue as best he could. Br. of Applt. at 24 .13. However, as noted above, 
defendant's pro se status does not relieve him of the duty to properly preserve issues for 
appeal. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % f 9, 56, 979 P.2d 799. In any event, while it is 
arguable that defendant adequately, though inartfully, preserved his Federal 
Constitutional challenge, he made no effort to challenge the statute under the Utah 
Constitution (R. 162:131-32, 141-42). Thus, his state constitutional claim is unpreserved 
and Archambeau applies. 
D. The trial court did not err at all. 
Even if this Court were to review the merits of defendant's claim, the plain 
language of Article I, Section 6 allows the legislature to enact laws, such as Section 76-
10-503, restricting felons from possessing firearms. Article I, Section 6 provides that 
"nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms." Utah 
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Const. Art. I, Sec. 6. This language "allows for greater legislative authority to regulate 
arms than is available in other states." M. Truman Hunt, Note, The Individual Right to 
Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 751, 764. Although some 
state constitutions expressly prescribe the scope of the legislature's regulatory power, the 
Utah Constitution gives the legislature unlimited authority to regulate all uses of weapons. 
A/.at764n.71. 
Article I, Section 6 does not restrict the legislature's regulatory power to regulating 
only the "use" of arms. Although the phrase "lawful use of arms" could be so interpreted, 
"[sjuch an interpretation would exceed any other individual right to bear arms 
interpretation." Id. Moreover, "this interpretation is unlikely and unsound because it 
would essentially invalidate all current Utah arms regulations." Id. Defendant cites no 
authority for his sweeping contention that the 1985 enactment of Article 1, Section 6 was 
intended to effectively repeal those parts of the criminal code that regulate the possession 
of firearms. 
Finally, as one commentator concluded, "[t]his prohibition of possession [in 
Section 76-10-503] undoubtedly remains valid under the new arms right [in the current 
version of Article 1, Section 6]." Id. at 765-66. The legislature may constitutionally 
restrict felons from possessing firearms "because of [its] broad regulating authority and 
the fact that all other individual right states have determined that an individual's right to 
bear arms is outweighed by the public benefit derived from prohibiting possession by 
felons and incompetents." Id. (Footnotes omitted). Thus, even if the Court were to 
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consider defendant's claim, Section 76-10-503 does not violate Article I, Section 6 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this II* day of July, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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THE COURT: Clay Hamilton Petty. The record may 
show that Mr. Petty is personally present. 
MZ. MORGAN: Your Honor, this matter is here for a 
trial resetting. Mr. Petty1s Bench trial was set for this 
Friday; however, it was a second setting and it's been bumped, 
so we need to pick a new trial date for it--excuse me--a jury 
trial, not a Bench trial. 
THE COURT: Jury trial? 
MZ. MORGAN: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. September 27th. 
MZ. MORGAN: 27t.h. 
DEFENSE MOTION FOR MZ, MORGAN TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
BY MZ. MORGAN: Additionally, Your Honor, Ifd just 
like to make the Court aware that Mr. Petty has asked that I 
withdraw as his counsel. He--he feels that he can represent 
himself. He's done so in the past on other matters, but he's 
asking that I remain present in the courtroom and assist him 
in preparing as Standby Counsel and so I told him that I would 
inform the Court of that today so that if, urn, the Court or 
the prosecutor just felt that any additional time might be 
required for the trial, given the fact that Mr. Petty will be 
questioning witnesses, that the Court would be aware of that 
at this point. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
THE 
MZ. 
THE 
MZ. 
THE 
COURT: 
MORGAN: 
COURT: 
MORGAN: 
COURT: 
All right. Are you appointed counsel--
I am, Your Honor. 
--in this case at this point? 
I am, Your Honor. 
All right. Now, Mr.--Mr. Petty, you're 
II proposing that you represent yourself; is that correct? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
PETTY: 
COURT: 
PETTY: 
|| my trial to go— 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
PETTY: 
II would like asked, the 
Yes, sir. 
Why are you making that choice? 1 
The direction I'd like my questioning in 
And you-- 1 
--and the questioning that I personally 
line of questioning in order to draw out | 
|| the evidence that I would like drawn out. J 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this. Have 
|| you been to law school? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
11 training? 
MR. 
1 THE 
1 MR. 
THE 
PETTY: 
COURT: 
PETTY: 
COURT: 
PETTY: 
COURT: 
PETTY: 
COURT: 
No, sir. 1 
You've not attended law school. 1 
No, sir. J 
Have you received--received any legal 
No, sir. J 
Have you studied law in any manner? 
Not formally, no, sir. 1 
Have you studied law informally? 
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MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. I have. 
THE COURT: And what has that consisted of? 
MR. PETTY: Urn, lots of reading of law books and the 
rules, urn, of trial; lots of the evidence area rules of what 
can be brought forth, what canft be brought forth. Urn, 
specifically, in my case as a parolee, I was on parole. I'm 
no longer on parole. But I studied my rights, I guess I would 
say, as someone who was on parole by the State of Utah. And 
those are issues that are going to be in my trial, so the 
background that I did before as the case even came 
up--(Inaudible)--with the relevant study I've done on it. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you familiar with 
the--familiar with the UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE? 
MR. PETTY: Some. That's why I would like 
Ms. Morgan to stay with me as my backup or whatever. 
MZ. MORGAN: Standby. 
MR. PETTY: Standby. If, ah, if, in our preparatory 
manner, whatever we get ready to do, she can tell me if I can 
or can't do that before the trial. 
THE COURT: All right. And are you familiar with 
the UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? 
MR. PETTY: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Petty, it would be 
the Court's opinion in this matter that, ah, you're doing 
yourself a disservice by attempting to represent yourself. 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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Mz. Morgan has graduated from college four years and then 
after that she went to three years of law school. How many 
years of college have you had? 
MR. PETTY: Three-and-a-half. 
THE COURT: All right. Well she's--she has 
three-and-a-half more than you do and three years have 
concentrated on the study of law, where I'm sure yours that 
you had has not concentrated on the study of law. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So you're entitled to represent 
yourself, if you wish, but I just caution you that you're 
going to be going up against a prosecutor who's been to law 
school and, ah, it's his duty to see that justice is done. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And he's going to prosecute this and 
attempt to prove you guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So you would be doing yourself a 
disservice, in this Court's opinion, by trying to represent 
yourself, even though you have Mz. Morgan as backup counsel. 
Now with that in mind do you still want to go ahead and 
represent yourself? 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. I do. 
COURT RULING 
THE COURT: All right. Well the Court's going to 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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allow you to represent yourself and the Court will allow Mz. 
Morgan to remain on as backup counsel--or standby counsel. We 
will set this for Jury Trial then to begin on September 27th 
at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
MZ. MORGAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(The above entitled proceedings were completed.) 
--00O00--
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evidence whatsoever that he committed the offense. The 
State—hefs presumed to be innocent of that offense and the 
State will have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he 
did commit the offense. 
We expect to take one day to complete this trial. 
Now this case is a little bit unusual. Not in the facts of 
the case, but because the defendant has elected to represent 
himself and, ah—and that means that he will be speaking for 
himself, he will be questioning the witnesses that testify, he 
will be making the opening statement, he will be making the 
closing argument, he will be responsible for objecting to any 
evidence that shouldn't be admitted. 
This is something that you should not concern 
yourself with. It may—it may mean that this wonft be quite 
as professional a job as you'd have with a lawyer, but you're 
to give him, ah, every, ah, presumption that he—that he would 
get if he were represented by an attorney. You're not to 
change the burden of proof. You're not to appoint yourselves 
as his lawyer because he doesn't have one. 
Urn, the—the Court has examined his decision to 
represent himself in exhaustive detail and it is very clearly 
his decision. He had the right to either hire someone to 
represent him or to obtain the assistance of court appointed 
counsel and he did not do either of those things. So money 
was not an issue, ah, and it was simply a matter of his choice 
1 not to take one of those options. He preferred to represent 
2 himself. 
3 Urn, he's going to have to follow the rules, 
4 nevertheless, and, ah, I hope that he's prepared himself to do 
5 that. I—I—as an assistance to him and as is routine in such 
6 cases, I have assigned, ah, the Public Defender to sit with 
7 him at counsel table as what we call standby counsel. She can 
8 answer his questions and help him understand the procedures 
9 that are being followed in the courtroom, but it is not her 
10 responsibility to represent him. She is not to represent him. 
11 She's not to ask questions. She's not to speak for him. 
12 She's there as a resource to help him. I just wanted you to 
13 understand that so that will explain the reason why she's 
14 seated at the table. Her name is Happy Morgan. She's at this 
15 table. 
16 Mr. Petty, the defendant, is seated also at that 
17 same table. The prosecutor is William Benge, who's the County 
18 Attorney, and he's seated at the other table. 
19 All right. Urn, as we start here, I'm going to ask 
20 each of you to provide some background information about 
21 yourself. I think there are about five items: How long 
22 you've lived in Grand County; what area of Grand County you 
23 live in; ah, the limits of your formal education; your 
24 occupation; and if you are married, the occupation of your 
25 spouse. 
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INSTRUCTION NO, 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove 
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those 
elements are as follows: 
1. That on or about August 17, 19 99; 
2. Defendant had been convicted of a felony; and 
3. Possessed or transferred a handgun^ 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
3 
INSTRUCTION NO. \Q 
The state must show that defendant acted intentionally or 
knowingly. A person acts intentionally if he has a conscious 
objective or desire to act or to cause a result. A person acts 
knowingly when he is aware of his conduct, aware of the 
circumstances, or aware of the likely results of his conduct. 
Intent or knowledge are states of mind not usually proved 
by direct evidence. You may infer intent or knowledge from acts, 
conduct, statements and circumstances. 
6 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute 
certainty. Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a 
doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to 
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain 
based upon the evidence in the case. 
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